A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics

Jonas Olson, Mark C Timmons

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Metaethical non-naturalism went from being a dominant theory at the turn of the nineteenth century to being an intellectual curiosity a few decades later. With regard to the mercurial fortunes of non-naturalism, the work of A. C. Ewing is an interesting case. In his 1947 The Definition of Good he defended non-naturalism. But by the early 1950s he proposed a 'middle way in ethics' - a metaethical position meant to represent a compromise between non-naturalism and its rival, non-cognitivism, defended in his 1959 Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. One aim of this chapter is to further explain and illustrate the decline of non-naturalism, using Ewing's two main works on moral philosophy as case studies. But we are also interested in the plausibility and indeed the metaethical space for the kind of compromise view Ewing aimed for with his middle way, and how his view contributes to contemporary metaethical debate.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationUnderivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Print)9780191725425, 9780199577446
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2011

Fingerprint

Metaethics
Moral philosophy
Compromise
Middle Way
Fortune
1950s
Curiosity
Rivals
Plausibility
Non-cognitivism

Keywords

  • Ewing
  • Metaethics
  • Moral philosophy
  • Non-cognitivism
  • Non-naturalism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Olson, J., & Timmons, M. C. (2011). A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics. In Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.003.0011

A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics. / Olson, Jonas; Timmons, Mark C.

Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Olson, J & Timmons, MC 2011, A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics. in Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.003.0011
Olson J, Timmons MC. A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics. In Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press. 2011 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.003.0011
Olson, Jonas ; Timmons, Mark C. / A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics. Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press, 2011.
@inbook{9f7cdf0c911d472a9c47346f36e6edb9,
title = "A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics",
abstract = "Metaethical non-naturalism went from being a dominant theory at the turn of the nineteenth century to being an intellectual curiosity a few decades later. With regard to the mercurial fortunes of non-naturalism, the work of A. C. Ewing is an interesting case. In his 1947 The Definition of Good he defended non-naturalism. But by the early 1950s he proposed a 'middle way in ethics' - a metaethical position meant to represent a compromise between non-naturalism and its rival, non-cognitivism, defended in his 1959 Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. One aim of this chapter is to further explain and illustrate the decline of non-naturalism, using Ewing's two main works on moral philosophy as case studies. But we are also interested in the plausibility and indeed the metaethical space for the kind of compromise view Ewing aimed for with his middle way, and how his view contributes to contemporary metaethical debate.",
keywords = "Ewing, Metaethics, Moral philosophy, Non-cognitivism, Non-naturalism",
author = "Jonas Olson and Timmons, {Mark C}",
year = "2011",
month = "5",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.003.0011",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9780191725425",
booktitle = "Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics

AU - Olson, Jonas

AU - Timmons, Mark C

PY - 2011/5/1

Y1 - 2011/5/1

N2 - Metaethical non-naturalism went from being a dominant theory at the turn of the nineteenth century to being an intellectual curiosity a few decades later. With regard to the mercurial fortunes of non-naturalism, the work of A. C. Ewing is an interesting case. In his 1947 The Definition of Good he defended non-naturalism. But by the early 1950s he proposed a 'middle way in ethics' - a metaethical position meant to represent a compromise between non-naturalism and its rival, non-cognitivism, defended in his 1959 Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. One aim of this chapter is to further explain and illustrate the decline of non-naturalism, using Ewing's two main works on moral philosophy as case studies. But we are also interested in the plausibility and indeed the metaethical space for the kind of compromise view Ewing aimed for with his middle way, and how his view contributes to contemporary metaethical debate.

AB - Metaethical non-naturalism went from being a dominant theory at the turn of the nineteenth century to being an intellectual curiosity a few decades later. With regard to the mercurial fortunes of non-naturalism, the work of A. C. Ewing is an interesting case. In his 1947 The Definition of Good he defended non-naturalism. But by the early 1950s he proposed a 'middle way in ethics' - a metaethical position meant to represent a compromise between non-naturalism and its rival, non-cognitivism, defended in his 1959 Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. One aim of this chapter is to further explain and illustrate the decline of non-naturalism, using Ewing's two main works on moral philosophy as case studies. But we are also interested in the plausibility and indeed the metaethical space for the kind of compromise view Ewing aimed for with his middle way, and how his view contributes to contemporary metaethical debate.

KW - Ewing

KW - Metaethics

KW - Moral philosophy

KW - Non-cognitivism

KW - Non-naturalism

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84862867052&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84862867052&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.003.0011

DO - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.003.0011

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:84862867052

SN - 9780191725425

SN - 9780199577446

BT - Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing

PB - Oxford University Press

ER -