A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by Goltsman et al. (2009) in the leading example of the Crawford-Sobel model can be obtained with strategy-correlated equilibria, thus preserving privacy vis-à-vis the mediator. More generally, all equilibrium outcomes of the ε-noise model of Blume et al. (2007), including outcomes with an uncountable infinity of equilibrium actions, can be obtained via strategy-correlated equilibria of the noise-free game. The occasional mismatch between the encoding and decoding rules used by sender and receiver in a strategy-correlated equilibrium can be interpreted as uncertainty about language use.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)510-517
Number of pages8
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume75
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2012
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Correlated equilibrium
Mediator
Efficiency bounds
Language
Communication equilibrium
Mismatch
Privacy preserving
Uncertainty

Keywords

  • Communication
  • Correlation
  • Information transmission
  • Language

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games. / Blume, Andreas -.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 75, No. 2, 07.2012, p. 510-517.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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