A comparison of multiple-unit all-pay and winner-pay auctions under incomplete information

Yasar Barut, Dan Kovenock, Charles N. Noussair

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

34 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article examines the properties of independent-private-value all-pay and winner-pay auctions when there are multiple units sold. We study bidding behavior, efficiency, and revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions. Our data show that the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent, though both yield higher revenue than the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium. Our evidence also suggests that the winner-pay auction is more likely to lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation than the all-pay auction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)675-708
Number of pages34
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume43
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2002
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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