A critical assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-style example

Research output: Research - peer-reviewArticle

Abstract

In this paper, I assess Derk Pereboom’s argument for the thesis that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise. I argue that the Frankfurt-style example Pereboom develops presupposes a prior act or omission which the agent was able to avoid. This undermines his argument. I propose a way for Pereboom to revise his example and thereby undercut this objection. Along the way, I also argue that Pereboom should supplement his account of what counts as a robust alternative—an alternative of the sort that should matter to those who argue for an ability-to-do-otherwise condition on moral responsibility.

LanguageEnglish (US)
Pages1-13
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophical Studies
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Oct 25 2017

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Moral Responsibility
Omission
Derk Pereboom
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Keywords

  • Frankfurt-style examples
  • Free will
  • Moral responsibility
  • Pereboom

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

A critical assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-style example. / McKenna, Michael.

In: Philosophical Studies, 25.10.2017, p. 1-13.

Research output: Research - peer-reviewArticle

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