A Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions

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Abstract

A number of philosophers have argued that psychiatric delusions threaten Donald Davidson's rationalist account of intentional agency. I argue that a careful look at both Davidson's account and psychiatric delusions shows that, in fact, the two are perfectly compatible. Indeed, a Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions proves remarkably illuminating.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)659-677
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume24
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2011

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Keywords

  • Donald davidson
  • Intentional agency
  • Psychiatric delusions
  • Rationality

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Applied Psychology
  • Philosophy

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