A Defense of De Re Belief Reports

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Abstract

Abstract: In Talk About Beliefs, Mark Crimmins claims that de re belief reports are not nearly as common as they are generally thought to be. In the following paper, I take issue with this claim. I begin with a critique of Crimmins’arguments on behalf of the claim, and then follow with an argument on behalf of the opposing claim: that de re belief reports are indeed quite common. In defending this claim, I make some observations about the nature of tacit reference, a phenomenon central to Crimmins’account of belief reports.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)446-463
Number of pages18
JournalMind & Language
Volume10
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1995

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Language and Linguistics
  • Philosophy
  • Linguistics and Language

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