A game-theoretic model for outsourcing maintenance services

Maryam Hamidi, Haitao Liao, Ferenc Szidarovszky

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Proactive maintenance improves the operational availability of a system and increases the owner's profit. To create more economic value along this direction, it is popular to outsource maintenance services to a service agent. However, due to various uncertainties in equipment failures and spare part logistics, making a service agreement between the owner and the service agent can be quite complex. In this paper, a game-theoretic cooperative model is presented to facilitate contract negotiation in such a joint decision-making process. In particular, the owner determines the time for preventive replacement and the service agent makes up a plan on ordering a spare part such that their overall profit is maximized. To sign a long-term contract, the two players need to share the overall profit in a fair manner based on Shapley values that satisfy certain axioms of fairness. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the solution methodology and to highlight the managerial implications in reliability and maintenance management.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Print)9781479928477
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Event60th Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, RAMS 2014 - Colorado Springs, CO, United States
Duration: Jan 27 2014Jan 30 2014

Other

Other60th Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, RAMS 2014
CountryUnited States
CityColorado Springs, CO
Period1/27/141/30/14

Fingerprint

Outsourcing
Profitability
Maintenance
Game
Spare Parts
Profit
Logistics
Decision making
Shapley Value
Availability
Model
Economics
Fairness
Axioms
Replacement
Decision Making
Uncertainty
Numerical Examples
Methodology

Keywords

  • cooperative game
  • renewal theory
  • replacement outsourcing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Mathematics(all)
  • Computer Science Applications

Cite this

Hamidi, M., Liao, H., & Szidarovszky, F. (2014). A game-theoretic model for outsourcing maintenance services. In Proceedings - Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium [6798514] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/RAMS.2014.6798514

A game-theoretic model for outsourcing maintenance services. / Hamidi, Maryam; Liao, Haitao; Szidarovszky, Ferenc.

Proceedings - Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014. 6798514.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Hamidi, M, Liao, H & Szidarovszky, F 2014, A game-theoretic model for outsourcing maintenance services. in Proceedings - Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium., 6798514, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 60th Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, RAMS 2014, Colorado Springs, CO, United States, 1/27/14. https://doi.org/10.1109/RAMS.2014.6798514
Hamidi M, Liao H, Szidarovszky F. A game-theoretic model for outsourcing maintenance services. In Proceedings - Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2014. 6798514 https://doi.org/10.1109/RAMS.2014.6798514
Hamidi, Maryam ; Liao, Haitao ; Szidarovszky, Ferenc. / A game-theoretic model for outsourcing maintenance services. Proceedings - Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014.
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