A multiresolution approach for optimal defense against random attacks

Michael Valenzuela, Ferenc Szidarovszky, Jerzy W Rozenblit

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Whether it be one security expert covering more systems or reducing total man-hours, there has always been a push to do more with less. Intuitively, we realize different systems need different levels of security. To aid in this effort, we develop multiresolution attacker/defender games by combining two game theoretic approaches: resource assignment and optimal response. We use the resource assignment game to determine the level of detail necessary to build the game needed to respond optimally to attacks. To aid in the selection of a resource assignment game and an optimal response game, we present considerations and survey numerous works. Further resource savings are possible when the optimal response games share features. Even though effort sharing between systems ought to be addressed during the resource-allocation game, we present both a linear effort sharing model and a method for solving post hoc. An illustrative example demonstrates the potential savings from our technique.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)61-72
Number of pages12
JournalInternational Journal of Information Security
Volume14
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014

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Keywords

  • Attacker/defender
  • Game theory
  • Games
  • Multiresolution
  • Security
  • Survey

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software
  • Information Systems
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Cite this

A multiresolution approach for optimal defense against random attacks. / Valenzuela, Michael; Szidarovszky, Ferenc; Rozenblit, Jerzy W.

In: International Journal of Information Security, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2014, p. 61-72.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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