A network-based scheme for allocating the cost of empty railcar movements in railway systems

Yao Cheng, Wei Hua Lin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In the freight industry, allocating the cost of empty miles of rail cars to partners in coalition is an important pricing problem. This paper proposes an empty car movement cost allocation scheme based on the game theory that explicitly considers the level of participation and contribution from each partner, the costs generated before and after cooperation, and the overall benefits obtained by each partner due to cooperation. Characterization of cost at each level of cooperation is considered based on the empty miles generated or reduced through cooperation. Compared with other existing models, the proposed cost allocation scheme consistently yields reasonable results, even under the situation in which other models behave poorly. We also show that the proposed pricing scheme can enhance the stability of a coalition such that the subgroup of a coalition will not be better off if the members of the subgroup choose to break away from the coalition.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationConference Proceeding - IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control
Pages844-849
Number of pages6
Volume2
StatePublished - 2004
EventConference Proceeding - 2004 IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control - Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China
Duration: Mar 21 2004Mar 23 2004

Other

OtherConference Proceeding - 2004 IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control
CountryTaiwan, Province of China
CityTaipei
Period3/21/043/23/04

Fingerprint

Costs
Railroad cars
Game theory
Rails
Industry

Keywords

  • Freight Transportation
  • Game Theory
  • Pricing
  • Rail Transportation Systems
  • Transportation network

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Cheng, Y., & Lin, W. H. (2004). A network-based scheme for allocating the cost of empty railcar movements in railway systems. In Conference Proceeding - IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control (Vol. 2, pp. 844-849)

A network-based scheme for allocating the cost of empty railcar movements in railway systems. / Cheng, Yao; Lin, Wei Hua.

Conference Proceeding - IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control. Vol. 2 2004. p. 844-849.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Cheng, Y & Lin, WH 2004, A network-based scheme for allocating the cost of empty railcar movements in railway systems. in Conference Proceeding - IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control. vol. 2, pp. 844-849, Conference Proceeding - 2004 IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control, Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China, 3/21/04.
Cheng Y, Lin WH. A network-based scheme for allocating the cost of empty railcar movements in railway systems. In Conference Proceeding - IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control. Vol. 2. 2004. p. 844-849
Cheng, Yao ; Lin, Wei Hua. / A network-based scheme for allocating the cost of empty railcar movements in railway systems. Conference Proceeding - IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control. Vol. 2 2004. pp. 844-849
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