A note on knowledge-first decision theory and practical adequacy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

According to Williamson (2000), your evidence at a given time is given by all the propositions you know at that time. According to traditional decision theory, in figuring out what to do you should consider all the states that are compatible with your evidence. The combination of the two views, knowledge-first decision theory, has it then that in figuring out what to do you should consider all and only those states compatible with what you know. If knowledge by inductive inference is possible, however, knowledgefirst decision theory would have you rule out for considerations states which you shouldn’t rule out. In this note, I first present this problem for knowledge-first decision theory, and then suggest a fix for it based on the idea that a proposition cannot be known unless it is practically adequate.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationPragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages206-211
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781351685252
ISBN (Print)9781138051829
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

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Adequacy
Decision Theory
Inductive Inference

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Comesana, J. M. (2018). A note on knowledge-first decision theory and practical adequacy. In Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology (pp. 206-211). Taylor and Francis.

A note on knowledge-first decision theory and practical adequacy. / Comesana, Juan M.

Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Taylor and Francis, 2018. p. 206-211.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Comesana, JM 2018, A note on knowledge-first decision theory and practical adequacy. in Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Taylor and Francis, pp. 206-211.
Comesana JM. A note on knowledge-first decision theory and practical adequacy. In Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Taylor and Francis. 2018. p. 206-211
Comesana, Juan M. / A note on knowledge-first decision theory and practical adequacy. Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Taylor and Francis, 2018. pp. 206-211
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