Admissibility and common belief

Geir B. Asheim, Martin Dufwenberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

The concept of 'fully permissible sets' is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)208-234
Number of pages27
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume42
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2003
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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