Affiliation bias in arbitration: An experimental approach

Sergio Puig, Anton Strezhnev

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

A characteristic feature of arbitration, a growing form of legal adjudication, is that each disputing party appoints an arbitrator. Commentators, however, suggest that party-appointed arbitrators tend to be biased in favor of their appointers. Evaluating this claim from data on historical disputes is problematic because of nonrandom selection of arbitrators. Here we use a novel experimental approach to estimate the causal effect of the appointing party. Using survey experiments with arbitration experts around the world, we show that professional arbitrators suffer from affiliation effects-a cognitive predisposition to favor the appointing party. At a methodological level, we offer a solution to the problem of measuring this effect when credible observational designs are lacking.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)371-398
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Legal Studies
Volume46
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2017

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Law

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