After objectivity: An empirical study of moral judgment

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Abstract

This paper develops an empirical argument that the rejection of moral objectivity leaves important features of moral judgment intact. In each of five reported experiments, a number of participants endorsed a nonobjectivist claim about a canonical moral violation. In four of these experiments, participants were also given a standard measure of moral judgment, the moral/conventional task. In all four studies, participants who respond as nonobjectivists about canonical moral violations still treat such violations in typical ways on the moral/conventional task. In particular, participants who give moral nonobjectivist responses still draw a clear distinction between canonical moral and conventional violations. Thus there is some reason to think that many of the central characteristics of moral judgment are preserved in the absence of a commitment to moral objectivity.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3-26
Number of pages24
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume17
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2004
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Applied Psychology
  • Philosophy

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