After objectivity: An empirical study of moral judgment

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

55 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper develops an empirical argument that the rejection of moral objectivity leaves important features of moral judgment intact. In each of five reported experiments, a number of participants endorsed a nonobjectivist claim about a canonical moral violation. In four of these experiments, participants were also given a standard measure of moral judgment, the moral/conventional task. In all four studies, participants who respond as nonobjectivists about canonical moral violations still treat such violations in typical ways on the moral/conventional task. In particular, participants who give moral nonobjectivist responses still draw a clear distinction between canonical moral and conventional violations. Thus there is some reason to think that many of the central characteristics of moral judgment are preserved in the absence of a commitment to moral objectivity.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3-26
Number of pages24
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume17
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2004
Externally publishedYes

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Objectivity
Empirical Study
Moral Judgment
Violations
Conventional
Rejection (Psychology)
Experiment
Rejection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

Cite this

After objectivity : An empirical study of moral judgment. / Nichols, Shaun B.

In: Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 1, 03.2004, p. 3-26.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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