Against arguments from reference

Ron Mallon, Edouard MacHery, Shaun B Nichols, Stephen Stich

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

73 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such 'arguments from reference.' Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross-cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture (Machery et al. 2004). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)332-356
Number of pages25
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume79
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2009

Fingerprint

Theory of Reference
Intuition
Philosophy
Philosopher

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

Cite this

Against arguments from reference. / Mallon, Ron; MacHery, Edouard; Nichols, Shaun B; Stich, Stephen.

In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 79, No. 2, 09.2009, p. 332-356.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Mallon, Ron ; MacHery, Edouard ; Nichols, Shaun B ; Stich, Stephen. / Against arguments from reference. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2009 ; Vol. 79, No. 2. pp. 332-356.
@article{dd066ffb6e4f4828aefe9ce387420798,
title = "Against arguments from reference",
abstract = "It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such 'arguments from reference.' Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross-cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture (Machery et al. 2004). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference.",
author = "Ron Mallon and Edouard MacHery and Nichols, {Shaun B} and Stephen Stich",
year = "2009",
month = "9",
doi = "10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00281.x",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "79",
pages = "332--356",
journal = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research",
issn = "0031-8205",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Against arguments from reference

AU - Mallon, Ron

AU - MacHery, Edouard

AU - Nichols, Shaun B

AU - Stich, Stephen

PY - 2009/9

Y1 - 2009/9

N2 - It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such 'arguments from reference.' Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross-cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture (Machery et al. 2004). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference.

AB - It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such 'arguments from reference.' Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross-cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture (Machery et al. 2004). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=70349304291&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=70349304291&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00281.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00281.x

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:70349304291

VL - 79

SP - 332

EP - 356

JO - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

JF - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

SN - 0031-8205

IS - 2

ER -