Agent-based simulation of an n-person game with parabolic payoff functions

Miklos N Szilagyi, Iren Somogyi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We report computer simulation experiments based on our agent-based simulation tool to model a new N-per-son game based on John Conway's Game of Life. The individual agents may choose between two behavior options: cooperation or defection. The payoff (reward/penalty) functions are given as two parabolas: one for each option. After a certain number of iterations, the behavior of the agents stabilizes to either a constant value or oscillates around such a value. The simulation's goal is to investigate the effects of intermediate behavior on a society of agents. We have performed a systematic investigation of this game for all six possible cases of the mutual positions of parabolic payoff functions crossing each other at two points: x 5 0.3 and 0.7 where x is the ratio of the cooperation choice to the total number of agents in the agent's neighborhood. The global ratios X(t) of the total number of cooperators in the entire array of agents as functions of time (itera-tions) and the solutions of the game Xfinal as functions of X0 were observed for each case for Pavlovian, greedy, and conformist agents. The solutions have predictable tendencies only when the neighborhood is the entire array of greedy or conformist agents. In all other cases unexpected properties emerge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)50-60
Number of pages11
JournalComplexity
Volume15
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2010

Fingerprint

Computer simulation
Experiments

Keywords

  • Agent-based simulation
  • Cooperation
  • Game of life
  • N-person games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General

Cite this

Agent-based simulation of an n-person game with parabolic payoff functions. / Szilagyi, Miklos N; Somogyi, Iren.

In: Complexity, Vol. 15, No. 3, 01.2010, p. 50-60.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{ecb062bb36a54e27a1cd7eb336b7de2e,
title = "Agent-based simulation of an n-person game with parabolic payoff functions",
abstract = "We report computer simulation experiments based on our agent-based simulation tool to model a new N-per-son game based on John Conway's Game of Life. The individual agents may choose between two behavior options: cooperation or defection. The payoff (reward/penalty) functions are given as two parabolas: one for each option. After a certain number of iterations, the behavior of the agents stabilizes to either a constant value or oscillates around such a value. The simulation's goal is to investigate the effects of intermediate behavior on a society of agents. We have performed a systematic investigation of this game for all six possible cases of the mutual positions of parabolic payoff functions crossing each other at two points: x 5 0.3 and 0.7 where x is the ratio of the cooperation choice to the total number of agents in the agent's neighborhood. The global ratios X(t) of the total number of cooperators in the entire array of agents as functions of time (itera-tions) and the solutions of the game Xfinal as functions of X0 were observed for each case for Pavlovian, greedy, and conformist agents. The solutions have predictable tendencies only when the neighborhood is the entire array of greedy or conformist agents. In all other cases unexpected properties emerge.",
keywords = "Agent-based simulation, Cooperation, Game of life, N-person games",
author = "Szilagyi, {Miklos N} and Iren Somogyi",
year = "2010",
month = "1",
doi = "10.1002/cplx.20289",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "15",
pages = "50--60",
journal = "Complexity",
issn = "1076-2787",
publisher = "John Wiley and Sons Inc.",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Agent-based simulation of an n-person game with parabolic payoff functions

AU - Szilagyi, Miklos N

AU - Somogyi, Iren

PY - 2010/1

Y1 - 2010/1

N2 - We report computer simulation experiments based on our agent-based simulation tool to model a new N-per-son game based on John Conway's Game of Life. The individual agents may choose between two behavior options: cooperation or defection. The payoff (reward/penalty) functions are given as two parabolas: one for each option. After a certain number of iterations, the behavior of the agents stabilizes to either a constant value or oscillates around such a value. The simulation's goal is to investigate the effects of intermediate behavior on a society of agents. We have performed a systematic investigation of this game for all six possible cases of the mutual positions of parabolic payoff functions crossing each other at two points: x 5 0.3 and 0.7 where x is the ratio of the cooperation choice to the total number of agents in the agent's neighborhood. The global ratios X(t) of the total number of cooperators in the entire array of agents as functions of time (itera-tions) and the solutions of the game Xfinal as functions of X0 were observed for each case for Pavlovian, greedy, and conformist agents. The solutions have predictable tendencies only when the neighborhood is the entire array of greedy or conformist agents. In all other cases unexpected properties emerge.

AB - We report computer simulation experiments based on our agent-based simulation tool to model a new N-per-son game based on John Conway's Game of Life. The individual agents may choose between two behavior options: cooperation or defection. The payoff (reward/penalty) functions are given as two parabolas: one for each option. After a certain number of iterations, the behavior of the agents stabilizes to either a constant value or oscillates around such a value. The simulation's goal is to investigate the effects of intermediate behavior on a society of agents. We have performed a systematic investigation of this game for all six possible cases of the mutual positions of parabolic payoff functions crossing each other at two points: x 5 0.3 and 0.7 where x is the ratio of the cooperation choice to the total number of agents in the agent's neighborhood. The global ratios X(t) of the total number of cooperators in the entire array of agents as functions of time (itera-tions) and the solutions of the game Xfinal as functions of X0 were observed for each case for Pavlovian, greedy, and conformist agents. The solutions have predictable tendencies only when the neighborhood is the entire array of greedy or conformist agents. In all other cases unexpected properties emerge.

KW - Agent-based simulation

KW - Cooperation

KW - Game of life

KW - N-person games

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=73349093131&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=73349093131&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1002/cplx.20289

DO - 10.1002/cplx.20289

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:73349093131

VL - 15

SP - 50

EP - 60

JO - Complexity

JF - Complexity

SN - 1076-2787

IS - 3

ER -