All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

40 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)170-177
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume114
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2004
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Reserve price
  • Second-price sealed-bid auction
  • Uniqueness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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