All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

Andreas - Blume, Paul Heidhues

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

38 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)170-177
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume114
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2004
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Reserve price
Nash equilibrium
Independent private values
Uniqueness
Vickrey auction
Sealed-bid auction

Keywords

  • Reserve price
  • Second-price sealed-bid auction
  • Uniqueness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. / Blume, Andreas -; Heidhues, Paul.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 114, No. 1, 01.2004, p. 170-177.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Blume, Andreas - ; Heidhues, Paul. / All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2004 ; Vol. 114, No. 1. pp. 170-177.
@article{5ce4080bf33642d88fbb57e1890107f9,
title = "All equilibria of the Vickrey auction",
abstract = "This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.",
keywords = "Reserve price, Second-price sealed-bid auction, Uniqueness",
author = "Blume, {Andreas -} and Paul Heidhues",
year = "2004",
month = "1",
doi = "10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "114",
pages = "170--177",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

AU - Blume, Andreas -

AU - Heidhues, Paul

PY - 2004/1

Y1 - 2004/1

N2 - This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.

AB - This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.

KW - Reserve price

KW - Second-price sealed-bid auction

KW - Uniqueness

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0347031432&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0347031432&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2

DO - 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0347031432

VL - 114

SP - 170

EP - 177

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

IS - 1

ER -