An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play

James C. Cox, Jason Shachat, Mark A Walker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan's model of Bayesian learning in games of incomplete information. A finite example is constructed in which the model generates unique predictions of subjects' choices in nearly all periods. When the "true" game defined by players' private information was one with a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, the experimental subjects' play converged to the equilibrium, as Jordan's theory predicts, even when the subjects had not attained complete information about one another. But when there were two pure strategy equilibria, the theory's predictions were not consistent with observed behavior. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: D83, C72, C92.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)11-33
Number of pages23
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume34
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2001

Fingerprint

Jordan
Prediction
Experiment
Bayesian learning
Nash equilibrium
Pure strategies
Learning in games
Complete information
Games of incomplete information
Private information
Pure strategy equilibrium
Economics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play. / Cox, James C.; Shachat, Jason; Walker, Mark A.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 34, No. 1, 01.2001, p. 11-33.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Cox, James C. ; Shachat, Jason ; Walker, Mark A. / An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2001 ; Vol. 34, No. 1. pp. 11-33.
@article{5b77f59e90214f7e8d65a016590145bd,
title = "An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play",
abstract = "We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan's model of Bayesian learning in games of incomplete information. A finite example is constructed in which the model generates unique predictions of subjects' choices in nearly all periods. When the {"}true{"} game defined by players' private information was one with a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, the experimental subjects' play converged to the equilibrium, as Jordan's theory predicts, even when the subjects had not attained complete information about one another. But when there were two pure strategy equilibria, the theory's predictions were not consistent with observed behavior. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: D83, C72, C92.",
author = "Cox, {James C.} and Jason Shachat and Walker, {Mark A}",
year = "2001",
month = "1",
doi = "10.1006/game.1999.0786",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "34",
pages = "11--33",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play

AU - Cox, James C.

AU - Shachat, Jason

AU - Walker, Mark A

PY - 2001/1

Y1 - 2001/1

N2 - We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan's model of Bayesian learning in games of incomplete information. A finite example is constructed in which the model generates unique predictions of subjects' choices in nearly all periods. When the "true" game defined by players' private information was one with a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, the experimental subjects' play converged to the equilibrium, as Jordan's theory predicts, even when the subjects had not attained complete information about one another. But when there were two pure strategy equilibria, the theory's predictions were not consistent with observed behavior. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: D83, C72, C92.

AB - We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan's model of Bayesian learning in games of incomplete information. A finite example is constructed in which the model generates unique predictions of subjects' choices in nearly all periods. When the "true" game defined by players' private information was one with a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, the experimental subjects' play converged to the equilibrium, as Jordan's theory predicts, even when the subjects had not attained complete information about one another. But when there were two pure strategy equilibria, the theory's predictions were not consistent with observed behavior. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: D83, C72, C92.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0041833734&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0041833734&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1006/game.1999.0786

DO - 10.1006/game.1999.0786

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0041833734

VL - 34

SP - 11

EP - 33

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 1

ER -