An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play

James C. Cox, Jason Shachat, Mark Walker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan's model of Bayesian learning in games of incomplete information. A finite example is constructed in which the model generates unique predictions of subjects' choices in nearly all periods. When the "true" game defined by players' private information was one with a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, the experimental subjects' play converged to the equilibrium, as Jordan's theory predicts, even when the subjects had not attained complete information about one another. But when there were two pure strategy equilibria, the theory's predictions were not consistent with observed behavior. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: D83, C72, C92.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)11-33
Number of pages23
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume34
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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