An experimental investigation of the hahn-noll revenue neutral auction for emissions licenses

Robert Franciosi, R. Mark Isaac, David E. Pingry, Stanley S. Reynolds

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

45 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper reports on three series of laboratory experiments designed to test the performance of the Hahn-Noll revenue neutral auction (RNA). An alternative institution, a no-rebate uniform price auction (UPA), is also examined as a benchmark. In these experiments, the RNA markets were little different from UPA markets in terms of either prices or market efficiencies. The two institutions did differ in terms of the distribution of the gains from exchange and of the propensity of bidders to engage in a certain type of overbidding.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-24
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume24
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1993

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

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