Ancient scepticism and ancient religion

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This paper considers an Epicurean challenge to the possibility of Sceptical inquiry (reminiscent of a famous paradox in Plato's Meno), and also explores Sextus' reply to that challenge. It suggests that Sextus makes the good point that one need not know, nor even believe, that p, in order to inquire whether p is so. However, it is less clear whether one can inquire if one lacks all beliefs; yet the Sceptics are sometimes thought to disavow all beliefs. The paper also discusses the vexed notion of Epicurean prolepses, and evaluates Sextus' argument for the claim that it is the Epicureans who are not well placed to inquire, given their epistemological commitments.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEpisteme, etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Print)9780191738036, 9780199696482
DOIs
StatePublished - May 24 2012

Fingerprint

Skepticism
Ancient Religion
Epistemological
Meno
Plato
Skeptics
Paradox

Keywords

  • Epicurean prolepses
  • Epicurus
  • Inquiry
  • Paradox of inquiry
  • Scepticism
  • Sextus Empiricus

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Annas, J. E. (2012). Ancient scepticism and ancient religion. In Episteme, etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696482.003.0004

Ancient scepticism and ancient religion. / Annas, Julia E.

Episteme, etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Annas, JE 2012, Ancient scepticism and ancient religion. in Episteme, etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696482.003.0004
Annas JE. Ancient scepticism and ancient religion. In Episteme, etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes. Oxford University Press. 2012 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696482.003.0004
Annas, Julia E. / Ancient scepticism and ancient religion. Episteme, etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes. Oxford University Press, 2012.
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