Applying virtue to ethics

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Virtue ethics is sometimes taken to be incapable of providing guidance for an individual's actions, as some other ethical theories do. I show how virtue ethics does provide guidance for action, and also meet the objection that, while it may account for what we ought to do, it cannot account for the force of duty and obligation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-14
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Applied Philosophy
Volume32
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2015

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Guidance
Virtue Ethics
Obligation
Ethical Theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Applying virtue to ethics. / Annas, Julia E.

In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 32, No. 1, 01.02.2015, p. 1-14.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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