Appropriability and market structure in a stochastic invention model

R. Mark Isaac, Stanley S Reynolds

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

26 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This research examines in the laboratory a class of game-theoretic equilibrium models of private research and development (R&D). We formulate a stochastic model of R&D investment whose predictions can be examined by using laboratory experiments. The noncooperative Nash equilibrium of our operational model yields testable predictions about the effects of appropriability and market structure on R&D. The experimental results support the hypothesis that the degree of appropriability is inversely related to R&D spending. The results strongly support the hypothesis that an increase in group size yields greater aggregate R&D. The noncooperative Nash equilibrium is shown to be a good predictor of central tendencies in the experiments.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)647-671
Number of pages25
JournalQuarterly Journal of Economics
Volume103
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 1988

Fingerprint

Market structure
Invention
Appropriability
Nash equilibrium
Prediction
Laboratory experiments
Stochastic model
Experiment
Predictors
Group size

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Appropriability and market structure in a stochastic invention model. / Isaac, R. Mark; Reynolds, Stanley S.

In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 103, No. 4, 1988, p. 647-671.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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