Are bald-faced lies deceptive after all?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

According to the traditional philosophical definition, you lie if and only if you say something that you believe to be false and you intend to deceive someone into believing what you say. However, philosophers have recently noted the existence of bald-faced lies, lies which are not intended to deceive anyone into believing what is said. As a result, many philosophers have removed deception from their definitions of lying. According to Jennifer Lackey, this is "an unhappy divorce' because it precludes an obvious explanation of the prima facie wrongness of lying. Moreover, Lackey claims that there is a sense of deception in which all lies are deceptive. In this paper, I argue that bald-faced lies are not deceptive on any plausible notion of deception. In addition, I argue that divorcing deception from lying may not be as unhappy a result as Lackey suggests.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)81-96
Number of pages16
JournalRatio
Volume28
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2015

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Deception
Philosopher
Wrongness
What Is Said
Divorce

Keywords

  • Bald-faced Lies
  • Concealing Information
  • Deception
  • Jennifer Lackey
  • Lying

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Are bald-faced lies deceptive after all? / Fallis, Don T.

In: Ratio, Vol. 28, No. 1, 01.03.2015, p. 81-96.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Fallis, Don T. / Are bald-faced lies deceptive after all?. In: Ratio. 2015 ; Vol. 28, No. 1. pp. 81-96.
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