Are Ex Ante CEO Severance Pay Contracts Consistent with Efficient Contracting?

Brian D. Cadman, John L. Campbell, Sandy J Klasa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Efficient contracting predicts that ex ante severance pay contracts are offered to chief executive officers (CEOs) as protection against downside risk and to encourage investment in risky projects with a positive net present value (NPV). Consistent with this prediction, we find that ex ante contracted severance pay is positively associated with proxies for a CEO's risk of dismissal and costs the CEO would incur from dismissal. Additionally, we show that the contracted severance payment amount is positively associated with CEO risk taking and the extent to which a CEO invests in projects that have a positive NPV. Overall, our findings imply that ex ante severance pay contracts are consistent with efficient contracting.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)737-769
Number of pages33
JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volume51
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2016

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Severance pay
Chief executive officer
Contracting
Net present value
Downside risk
Prediction
Costs
Severance payments
Risk taking

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Are Ex Ante CEO Severance Pay Contracts Consistent with Efficient Contracting? / Cadman, Brian D.; Campbell, John L.; Klasa, Sandy J.

In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 51, No. 3, 01.06.2016, p. 737-769.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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