Aristotle contra Plato on the Voluntariness of Vice: The Arguments of Nicomachean Ethics 3.5

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Abstract

Aristotle's arguments in NE 3.5 target Plato's position that vice is not blameworthy but to be pitied because involuntary, i.e. contrary to our wish for our good - not the 'Socratic paradox' that wrongdoing is involuntary. To this end, Aristotle develops a causal account of voluntary action based on Plato, Laws 9, but replaces Plato's character-based classification of actions with his own distinction between performing actions of a certain type and having a character of that type. This distinction, central to Aristotle's account of character-formation by habituating actions, allows Aristotle to show how character, whether vicious or virtuous, can be voluntary.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)57-83
Number of pages27
JournalPhronesis
Volume64
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

Fingerprint

Aristotle
Plato
Voluntariness
Nicomachean Ethics
Involuntary
Wishes
Voluntary Action
Causal
Paradox
Wrongdoing

Keywords

  • action
  • blame
  • character
  • habituation
  • involuntary
  • vice
  • voluntary

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

Cite this

Aristotle contra Plato on the Voluntariness of Vice : The Arguments of Nicomachean Ethics 3.5. / Kamtekar, Rachana -.

In: Phronesis, Vol. 64, No. 1, 01.01.2019, p. 57-83.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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