Abstract
Many researchers use subliminal priming to investigate domain-specific processing mechanisms, which have classically been defined in terms of their autonomy from other cognitive systems. Surprisingly, recent research has demonstrated that nonconsciously elicited cognitive processes are not independent of attention. By extension, these findings have been used to call into question the autonomy of domain-specific processing mechanisms. By contrast, we argue that the demonstrated modulation of nonconscious cognitive processes by attention occurs at a predomain-specific stage of processing. Thus, although we agree that attention might be a prerequisite of nonconscious processes, we suggest that there is no reason to think that higher-level cognitive systems directly modulate domain-specific processes.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 59-64 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | Trends in Cognitive Sciences |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 2008 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Cognitive Neuroscience
Cite this
Attention, intention and domain-specific processing. / Finkbeiner, Matthew; Forster, Kenneth I.
In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 12, No. 2, 02.2008, p. 59-64.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Attention, intention and domain-specific processing
AU - Finkbeiner, Matthew
AU - Forster, Kenneth I
PY - 2008/2
Y1 - 2008/2
N2 - Many researchers use subliminal priming to investigate domain-specific processing mechanisms, which have classically been defined in terms of their autonomy from other cognitive systems. Surprisingly, recent research has demonstrated that nonconsciously elicited cognitive processes are not independent of attention. By extension, these findings have been used to call into question the autonomy of domain-specific processing mechanisms. By contrast, we argue that the demonstrated modulation of nonconscious cognitive processes by attention occurs at a predomain-specific stage of processing. Thus, although we agree that attention might be a prerequisite of nonconscious processes, we suggest that there is no reason to think that higher-level cognitive systems directly modulate domain-specific processes.
AB - Many researchers use subliminal priming to investigate domain-specific processing mechanisms, which have classically been defined in terms of their autonomy from other cognitive systems. Surprisingly, recent research has demonstrated that nonconsciously elicited cognitive processes are not independent of attention. By extension, these findings have been used to call into question the autonomy of domain-specific processing mechanisms. By contrast, we argue that the demonstrated modulation of nonconscious cognitive processes by attention occurs at a predomain-specific stage of processing. Thus, although we agree that attention might be a prerequisite of nonconscious processes, we suggest that there is no reason to think that higher-level cognitive systems directly modulate domain-specific processes.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=38549171467&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=38549171467&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.tics.2007.11.003
DO - 10.1016/j.tics.2007.11.003
M3 - Article
C2 - 18178512
AN - SCOPUS:38549171467
VL - 12
SP - 59
EP - 64
JO - Trends in Cognitive Sciences
JF - Trends in Cognitive Sciences
SN - 1364-6613
IS - 2
ER -