Blowing the whistle

Jose Apesteguia, Martin Dufwenberg, Reinhard Selten

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

56 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, experimentally.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)143-166
Number of pages24
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume31
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2007

Fingerprint

Leniency
Cartels
Innovation
Authority
Immunity
Collusion
Whistle blowing

Keywords

  • Amnesty
  • Anti-trust
  • Bertrand model
  • Blow the whistle
  • Cartels
  • Experiment communication
  • Immunity
  • Leniency
  • Price competition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Blowing the whistle. / Apesteguia, Jose; Dufwenberg, Martin; Selten, Reinhard.

In: Economic Theory, Vol. 31, No. 1, 04.2007, p. 143-166.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Apesteguia, J, Dufwenberg, M & Selten, R 2007, 'Blowing the whistle', Economic Theory, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 143-166. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8
Apesteguia, Jose ; Dufwenberg, Martin ; Selten, Reinhard. / Blowing the whistle. In: Economic Theory. 2007 ; Vol. 31, No. 1. pp. 143-166.
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