Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy

Ye Cai, Dan S Dhaliwal, Yongtae Kim, Carrie Pan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

26 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine whether board connections through shared directors influence firm disclosure policies. To overcome endogeneity challenges, we focus on an event that represents a significant change in firm disclosure policy: the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance. Our research design allows us to exploit the timing of director interlocks and therefore differentiate the director interlock effect on disclosure policy contagion from alternative explanations, such as endogenous director-firm matching or strategic board stacking. We find that firms are more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance if they share directors with previous guidance stoppers. We also find that director-specific experience from prior guidance cessations matters for disclosure policy contagion. The positive effect of interlocked directors on the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation is particularly strong for firms with interlocked directors who experienced positive outcomes from prior guidance cessation decisions. Overall, our evidence is consistent with interlocked directors serving as conduits for information sharing that leads to the spread of corporate disclosure policies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1086-1119
Number of pages34
JournalReview of Accounting Studies
Volume19
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014

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Interlock
Disclosure policy
Earnings guidance
Guidance
Contagion
Corporate disclosure
Information sharing
Research design
Endogeneity

Keywords

  • Board interlocks
  • Board networks
  • Corporate governance
  • Disclosure policy
  • Earnings guidance
  • Social networks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Accounting

Cite this

Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy. / Cai, Ye; Dhaliwal, Dan S; Kim, Yongtae; Pan, Carrie.

In: Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2014, p. 1086-1119.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Cai, Ye ; Dhaliwal, Dan S ; Kim, Yongtae ; Pan, Carrie. / Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy. In: Review of Accounting Studies. 2014 ; Vol. 19, No. 3. pp. 1086-1119.
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