Can groups be epistemic agents?

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

7 Scopus citations


In this paper, I confront an objection to group epistemic agency that has been posed in two separate papers (Meijers 2002 and McMahon 2003). They argue that groups are never "independent" epistemic agents. I discuss a number of cases where the beliefs of groups and of their members may diverge. I argue that these cases show that groups may be independent epistemic agents. We can conclude from this that work on "agent centered" epistemology should focus on groups as well as individuals.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCollective Epistemology
PublisherDe Gruyter Mouton
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9783110322583
ISBN (Print)9783110322231
StatePublished - May 2 2013
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

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