CEO Noncompete Agreements, Job Risk, and Compensation

Omesh Kini, Ryan Williams, Sirui Yin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Using hand-collected data on CEO noncompete agreements (NCAs), we find that NCAs are less common when CEOs expect to incur greater personal costs from reduced job mobility and more common when firms expect to suffer greater economic harm if departing CEOs leave to work for a competitor. Additionally, turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger when CEOs have NCAs. Finally, total compensation and incentive pay are higher if CEOs have more enforceable NCAs. Our identification strategy exploits staggered state-level changes in NCA enforceability. Overall, our findings suggest that restrictions on job mobility have important implications for how CEOs are monitored and compensated.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)4701-4744
Number of pages44
JournalReview of Financial Studies
Volume34
Issue number10
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2021
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • G30
  • G32
  • G34
  • K22
  • L22
  • L25

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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