TY - JOUR
T1 - Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge
T2 - An experimental study
AU - Blume, Andreas
AU - Gneezy, Uri
N1 - Funding Information:
✩ We acknowledge support through a grant from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9808947). We thank Oliver Board, Moshe Hoffman, Jack Ochs, the associate editor, an anonymous referee, seminar audiences at the ESA meetings, the Summer meetings of the Econometric Society, Arizona State University, Harvard University, Ohio State University, the University of Iowa, the University of Pittsburgh, the Technion and the WZB (Social Science Research Center, Berlin). We are especially grateful to Michael Bacharach for his detailed comments. * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: ablume@pitt.edu (A. Blume), ugneezy@ucsd.edu (U. Gneezy).
PY - 2010/3
Y1 - 2010/3
N2 - This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games in which cognition plays an important role. In our game logically omniscient players would be able to identify a distinct coordination opportunity from other obvious facts. Real players may be unable to make the required inference. Our main experimental results are that in a coordination task with a cognitive component (1) players play differently when playing against themselves rather than against another player, and (2) given the opportunity, players signal cognition by choosing the coordination task over an outside option, a phenomenon which we refer to as cognitive forward induction.
AB - This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games in which cognition plays an important role. In our game logically omniscient players would be able to identify a distinct coordination opportunity from other obvious facts. Real players may be unable to make the required inference. Our main experimental results are that in a coordination task with a cognitive component (1) players play differently when playing against themselves rather than against another player, and (2) given the opportunity, players signal cognition by choosing the coordination task over an outside option, a phenomenon which we refer to as cognitive forward induction.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=75349083413&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=75349083413&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.011
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.011
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:75349083413
VL - 68
SP - 488
EP - 511
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 2
ER -