TY - JOUR
T1 - Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge
T2 - An experimental study
AU - Blume, Andreas
AU - Gneezy, Uri
PY - 2010/3/1
Y1 - 2010/3/1
N2 - This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games in which cognition plays an important role. In our game logically omniscient players would be able to identify a distinct coordination opportunity from other obvious facts. Real players may be unable to make the required inference. Our main experimental results are that in a coordination task with a cognitive component (1) players play differently when playing against themselves rather than against another player, and (2) given the opportunity, players signal cognition by choosing the coordination task over an outside option, a phenomenon which we refer to as cognitive forward induction.
AB - This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games in which cognition plays an important role. In our game logically omniscient players would be able to identify a distinct coordination opportunity from other obvious facts. Real players may be unable to make the required inference. Our main experimental results are that in a coordination task with a cognitive component (1) players play differently when playing against themselves rather than against another player, and (2) given the opportunity, players signal cognition by choosing the coordination task over an outside option, a phenomenon which we refer to as cognitive forward induction.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.011
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.011
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:75349083413
VL - 68
SP - 488
EP - 511
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 2
ER -