Heal (1996a) maintains that evidence of cognitive penetrability doesn't determine whether stimulation theory or theory theory wins. Given the wide variety of mechanisms and processes that get called 'simulation', we argue that it's not useful to ask 'who wins?'. The label 'simulation' picks out no natural or theoretically interesting category. We propose a more fine-grained taxonomy and argue that some processes that have been labelled 'simulation', e.g., 'actual-situation-simulation', clearly do exist, while other processes labelled 'simulation', e.g., 'pretence-driven-off-line-simulation' are quite controversial. We do concede that evidence of cognitive penetrability isn't decisive evidence against pretence-driven-off-line-simulation. Nonetheless, advocates of pretence-driven-off-line-simulation need to provide some explanation of the experimental evidence of penetrability. We argue that Heal's suggestion that simulation is restricted to 'rational' processes is unprincipled, and we offer an alternative proposal for restricted simulation.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||30|
|Journal||Mind and Language|
|State||Published - Sep 1 1997|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Language and Linguistics
- Linguistics and Language