Collaborative institutions in an ecology of games

Mark Lubell, Adam D Henry, Mike McCoy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

110 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article seeks to improve our understanding of policy institutions and cooperation by adapting Long's (1958)analysis of the ecology of games to the context of collaborative land use and transportation planning in California. The traditional institutional rational choice analysis argues that collaborative institutions reduce the transaction costs of cooperation among multiple policy actors. The ecology of games framework extends IRC by emphasizing the consequences of multiple institutions and identifies several reasons why collaborative institutions may actually reduce the amount of cooperation in existing policy venues. Analyses of survey data from policy actors in five California regions demonstrate that higher levels of cooperation in collaborative institutions are associated with lower levels of cooperation in other land-use and transportation planning institutions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)287-300
Number of pages14
JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
Volume54
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2010
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

ecology
land use
planning
transaction costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Collaborative institutions in an ecology of games. / Lubell, Mark; Henry, Adam D; McCoy, Mike.

In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 2, 04.2010, p. 287-300.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Lubell, Mark ; Henry, Adam D ; McCoy, Mike. / Collaborative institutions in an ecology of games. In: American Journal of Political Science. 2010 ; Vol. 54, No. 2. pp. 287-300.
@article{ba80b41f364f4d02a50e43c23bede507,
title = "Collaborative institutions in an ecology of games",
abstract = "This article seeks to improve our understanding of policy institutions and cooperation by adapting Long's (1958)analysis of the ecology of games to the context of collaborative land use and transportation planning in California. The traditional institutional rational choice analysis argues that collaborative institutions reduce the transaction costs of cooperation among multiple policy actors. The ecology of games framework extends IRC by emphasizing the consequences of multiple institutions and identifies several reasons why collaborative institutions may actually reduce the amount of cooperation in existing policy venues. Analyses of survey data from policy actors in five California regions demonstrate that higher levels of cooperation in collaborative institutions are associated with lower levels of cooperation in other land-use and transportation planning institutions.",
author = "Mark Lubell and Henry, {Adam D} and Mike McCoy",
year = "2010",
month = "4",
doi = "10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00431.x",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "54",
pages = "287--300",
journal = "American Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0092-5853",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Collaborative institutions in an ecology of games

AU - Lubell, Mark

AU - Henry, Adam D

AU - McCoy, Mike

PY - 2010/4

Y1 - 2010/4

N2 - This article seeks to improve our understanding of policy institutions and cooperation by adapting Long's (1958)analysis of the ecology of games to the context of collaborative land use and transportation planning in California. The traditional institutional rational choice analysis argues that collaborative institutions reduce the transaction costs of cooperation among multiple policy actors. The ecology of games framework extends IRC by emphasizing the consequences of multiple institutions and identifies several reasons why collaborative institutions may actually reduce the amount of cooperation in existing policy venues. Analyses of survey data from policy actors in five California regions demonstrate that higher levels of cooperation in collaborative institutions are associated with lower levels of cooperation in other land-use and transportation planning institutions.

AB - This article seeks to improve our understanding of policy institutions and cooperation by adapting Long's (1958)analysis of the ecology of games to the context of collaborative land use and transportation planning in California. The traditional institutional rational choice analysis argues that collaborative institutions reduce the transaction costs of cooperation among multiple policy actors. The ecology of games framework extends IRC by emphasizing the consequences of multiple institutions and identifies several reasons why collaborative institutions may actually reduce the amount of cooperation in existing policy venues. Analyses of survey data from policy actors in five California regions demonstrate that higher levels of cooperation in collaborative institutions are associated with lower levels of cooperation in other land-use and transportation planning institutions.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77954282820&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77954282820&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00431.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00431.x

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:77954282820

VL - 54

SP - 287

EP - 300

JO - American Journal of Political Science

JF - American Journal of Political Science

SN - 0092-5853

IS - 2

ER -