Collective cooperation in common pool resources

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

One of the most compelling images and persuasive arguments capturing natural resource destruction is that of Garrett Hardin's (1968) tragedy of the commons. The dynamic captured by the tragedy of the commons has long been recognized as the source of natural resource degradation. H. Scott Gordon (1954) and Anthony Scott (1955), in developing the bio-economic model, argued that open-access conditions in fisheries lead to the economic destruction of stocks. In public choice and game theory, a similar dynamic is captured by Olson's (1965) work on collective action and the prisoner's dilemma game, thus generalizing the dynamic across the social sciences, further enhancing its grip on scholars, policy makers, and citizens alike (see chapter 1).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCooperation in Modern Society
Subtitle of host publicationPromoting the Welfare of Communities, States and Organizations
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages119-140
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9781135124243
ISBN (Print)041521758X, 9780415758222
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

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    Schlager, E. (2012). Collective cooperation in common pool resources. In Cooperation in Modern Society: Promoting the Welfare of Communities, States and Organizations (pp. 119-140). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203354254-13