Commandeering, coercion, and the deep structure of American federalism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

The anti-commandeering and anti-coercion principles announced in New York v. United States and NFIB v. Sebelius have great potential importance, but the most prominent justification for them is seriously flawed. This Article elaborates a more persuasive and largely neglected alternative, grounded in the deep structure of American federalism. Simply put, both commandeering and coercive conditional spending transfer control of state governments from their constitutionally designated electoral constituencies to Congress. This threat is probably insufficient to justify the anti-commandeering and anti-coercion principles-it is only one element of a more complex federalism calculus-but any persuasive critique or defense of these doctrines must take account of it.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-34
Number of pages34
JournalBoston University Law Review
Volume95
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 1 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Law

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