Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games

Andreas - Blume, Joel Sobel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We define communication-proof equilibria in simple games of communication. These equilibria satisfy a stability condition guaranteeing that they would not be affected if new opportunities to communicate arose. We look for partitions of possible equilibria into sets of good and bad equilibria. The good equilibria are those that cannot be destabilized by another good equilibrium. The remaining equilibria are bad. An equilibrium for the original game is communication proof if its is a good equilibrium in a partition of this form. We prove that communication-proof equilibria exist and, for a class of common-interest games, communication-proof outcomes are efficient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D80.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)359-382
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume65
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1995
Externally publishedYes

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Communication
Cheap talk
Economics
Simple game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games. / Blume, Andreas -; Sobel, Joel.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 65, No. 2, 04.1995, p. 359-382.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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