Consistency and communication in committees

Inga Deimen, Felix Ketelaar, Mark T. Le Quement

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)24-35
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume160
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Cheap talk
  • Committees
  • Information aggregation
  • Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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