Disenabling levy's frankfurt-style enabling cases

Ishtiyaque Haji, Michael S McKenna

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom-relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt-style examples are not cogent. In this paper, we explain why his argument fails.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)400-414
Number of pages15
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume92
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2011

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Frankfurt-style Cases
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Cite this

Disenabling levy's frankfurt-style enabling cases. / Haji, Ishtiyaque; McKenna, Michael S.

In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 92, No. 3, 09.2011, p. 400-414.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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