Domestic unrest and the initiation of negotiations

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The main argument of this article is that we need to incorporate domestic-pressure arguments into conflict management studies and, at the same time, we need to include conflict-management opportunities in the study of domestic-international theory. This study looks at the impact of domestic incentives on a state's decision to negotiate. The primary hypothesis is that domestic turmoil will increase the likelihood that rival states with a history of aggressive interaction shift their foreign policy to a more accommodative one. Testing my argument on strategic rivals between 1945 and 1995, I find that after controlling for the factors of history and level of hostility between the rivals, anti-government unrest actually increases the likelihood of negotiations taking place, while acts threatening the downfall of the regime tend to decrease the chance of witnessing negotiations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)69-85
Number of pages17
JournalInternational Negotiation
Volume16
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2011

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conflict management
history
foreign policy
incentive
regime
interaction

Keywords

  • conflict
  • conflict management
  • domestic pressure
  • linkage politics
  • negotiation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Political Science and International Relations
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Domestic unrest and the initiation of negotiations. / Halawi-Ghosn, Faten Yasser.

In: International Negotiation, Vol. 16, No. 1, 01.01.2011, p. 69-85.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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