Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debatepeer-review


The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of selfrepresentational accounts.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalPsyche (Pasadena)
Issue number2006
StatePublished - Jan 1 2006


  • Cognitive gaps
  • Consciousness
  • Dual content
  • Presentation
  • Self-representation
  • Subjectivity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
  • Philosophy
  • Cognitive Neuroscience
  • Artificial Intelligence


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