Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self-representational accounts.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-11
Number of pages11
JournalPsyche
Volume12
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2006

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Keywords

  • Cognitive gaps
  • Consciousness
  • Dual content
  • Presentation
  • Self-representation
  • Subjectivity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

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