Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self-representational accounts.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-11
Number of pages11
JournalPsyche
Volume12
Issue number2
StatePublished - 2006

Fingerprint

Plague
Consciousness
Cognitive Architecture
Physical
Defenders
Phenomenal Consciousness
Subjectivity

Keywords

  • Cognitive gaps
  • Consciousness
  • Dual content
  • Presentation
  • Self-representation
  • Subjectivity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

Cite this

Doublemindedness : A model for a dual content cognitive architecture. / Ismael, Jenann -.

In: Psyche, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2006, p. 1-11.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{1e130b8d234a4e8182be0a663667454c,
title = "Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture",
abstract = "The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self-representational accounts.",
keywords = "Cognitive gaps, Consciousness, Dual content, Presentation, Self-representation, Subjectivity",
author = "Ismael, {Jenann -}",
year = "2006",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "12",
pages = "1--11",
journal = "Psyche",
issn = "1039-723X",
publisher = "Association for the Scientific Study of Conciousness",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Doublemindedness

T2 - A model for a dual content cognitive architecture

AU - Ismael, Jenann -

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self-representational accounts.

AB - The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self-representational accounts.

KW - Cognitive gaps

KW - Consciousness

KW - Dual content

KW - Presentation

KW - Self-representation

KW - Subjectivity

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33745845137&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33745845137&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:33745845137

VL - 12

SP - 1

EP - 11

JO - Psyche

JF - Psyche

SN - 1039-723X

IS - 2

ER -