Dual processes and moral rules

Ron Mallon, Shaun B Nichols

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recent work proclaims a dominant role for automatic, intuitive, and emotional processes in producing ordinary moral judgment, despite the fact that we have little direct evidence about moral judgment "in the wild." Indirect support comes via an assumption of dual-process theory: that conscious, reasoning processes are resource intensive. We argue that reasoning that employs consciously available moral rules undermines this assumption, but this has not been appreciated because of a failure to distinguish between explanation and justification. We conclude that it remains unclear what sorts of cognitive processes are dominant in ordinary moral judgments.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)284-285
Number of pages2
JournalEmotion Review
Volume3
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2011

Fingerprint

Dual Process
Moral Judgment
Moral Rules
Dual Process Theory
Cognitive Processes
Justification
Resources
Emotion
Conscious

Keywords

  • automatic process
  • Bargh
  • dual process
  • emotion
  • Greene
  • Haidt
  • intuition
  • moral dumbfounding
  • moral judgment
  • moral rules

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
  • Social Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Dual processes and moral rules. / Mallon, Ron; Nichols, Shaun B.

In: Emotion Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 07.2011, p. 284-285.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Mallon, Ron ; Nichols, Shaun B. / Dual processes and moral rules. In: Emotion Review. 2011 ; Vol. 3, No. 3. pp. 284-285.
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