Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response

Andreas - Blume, Ernest K. Lai, Wooyoung Lim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Theory suggests that garbling may improve the transmission of private information. A simple garbling procedure, randomized response, has shown promise in the field. We provide the first complete analysis of randomized response as a game and implement it as an experiment. We find in our experiment that randomized response increases truth-telling and, importantly, does so in instances where being truthful adversely affects posterior beliefs. Our theoretical analysis also reveals, however, that randomized response has a plethora of equilibria in addition to truth-telling equilibria. Lab behavior is most consistent with those informative but not truth-telling equilibria.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2018

Fingerprint

Private information
Truth-telling
Randomized experiments
Theoretical analysis
Experiment

Keywords

  • Communication
  • Garbling
  • Information transmission
  • Laboratory experiment
  • Randomized response

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Eliciting private information with noise : The case of randomized response. / Blume, Andreas -; Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, 01.01.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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