Epistemic pragmatism: An argument against moderation

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

By "epistemic pragmatism" in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known or being justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much evidence we need in favor of a proposition in order to know that the proposition is true depends on our preferences. According to what I snail call extreme epistemic pragmatism, on the other hand, our preferences influence our epistemic position at a more basic level, because they help determine how much justification we actually have in favor of the proposition in question. Simplifying brutally, moderate epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition's being false, the more justification we need in order to know it, whereas extreme epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition's being false, the less justification we have for it. Recently, Fantl and McGrath have presented an interesting argument for moderate epistemic pragmatism, an argument which relies on the principle that (roughly) knowledge is sufficient for action (KA). In this paper I argue that KA, together with a plausible principle about second-order evidence, entails extreme epistemic pragmatism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)237-260
Number of pages24
JournalRes Philosophica
Volume90
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013

Fingerprint

Pragmatism
Moderation
Justification

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Epistemic pragmatism : An argument against moderation. / Comesana, Juan M.

In: Res Philosophica, Vol. 90, No. 2, 2013, p. 237-260.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{646e0d43ff8e475081a55eb4372dcf89,
title = "Epistemic pragmatism: An argument against moderation",
abstract = "By {"}epistemic pragmatism{"} in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known or being justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much evidence we need in favor of a proposition in order to know that the proposition is true depends on our preferences. According to what I snail call extreme epistemic pragmatism, on the other hand, our preferences influence our epistemic position at a more basic level, because they help determine how much justification we actually have in favor of the proposition in question. Simplifying brutally, moderate epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition's being false, the more justification we need in order to know it, whereas extreme epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition's being false, the less justification we have for it. Recently, Fantl and McGrath have presented an interesting argument for moderate epistemic pragmatism, an argument which relies on the principle that (roughly) knowledge is sufficient for action (KA). In this paper I argue that KA, together with a plausible principle about second-order evidence, entails extreme epistemic pragmatism.",
author = "Comesana, {Juan M}",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.11612/resphil.2013.90.2.9",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "90",
pages = "237--260",
journal = "Res Philosophica",
issn = "2168-9105",
publisher = "Philosophy Documentation Center",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Epistemic pragmatism

T2 - An argument against moderation

AU - Comesana, Juan M

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - By "epistemic pragmatism" in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known or being justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much evidence we need in favor of a proposition in order to know that the proposition is true depends on our preferences. According to what I snail call extreme epistemic pragmatism, on the other hand, our preferences influence our epistemic position at a more basic level, because they help determine how much justification we actually have in favor of the proposition in question. Simplifying brutally, moderate epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition's being false, the more justification we need in order to know it, whereas extreme epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition's being false, the less justification we have for it. Recently, Fantl and McGrath have presented an interesting argument for moderate epistemic pragmatism, an argument which relies on the principle that (roughly) knowledge is sufficient for action (KA). In this paper I argue that KA, together with a plausible principle about second-order evidence, entails extreme epistemic pragmatism.

AB - By "epistemic pragmatism" in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known or being justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much evidence we need in favor of a proposition in order to know that the proposition is true depends on our preferences. According to what I snail call extreme epistemic pragmatism, on the other hand, our preferences influence our epistemic position at a more basic level, because they help determine how much justification we actually have in favor of the proposition in question. Simplifying brutally, moderate epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition's being false, the more justification we need in order to know it, whereas extreme epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition's being false, the less justification we have for it. Recently, Fantl and McGrath have presented an interesting argument for moderate epistemic pragmatism, an argument which relies on the principle that (roughly) knowledge is sufficient for action (KA). In this paper I argue that KA, together with a plausible principle about second-order evidence, entails extreme epistemic pragmatism.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84900617326&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84900617326&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.11612/resphil.2013.90.2.9

DO - 10.11612/resphil.2013.90.2.9

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84900617326

VL - 90

SP - 237

EP - 260

JO - Res Philosophica

JF - Res Philosophica

SN - 2168-9105

IS - 2

ER -