In his paper " The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality," Sanford Goldberg argues that reiying on testimony makes the warrant for our beliefs " socially diffuse" and that this diminishes our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Thus, according to Goldberg, rationality itself is socially diffuse. I argue that while testimonial warrant may be socially diffuse (because it depends on the warrants of other epistemic agents) this feature has no special link to our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Nevertheless, I endorse Goldberg's claim about rationality and I propose that a Foley-style account of rationality might help to better articulate Goldberg's proposal.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||12|
|Journal||Southern Journal of Philosophy|
|State||Published - Dec 1 2006|
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