Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In order to guide the decisions of real people who want to bring about good epistemic outcomes for themselves and others, we need to understand our epistemic values. In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman has proposed an epistemic value theory that allows us to say whether one outcome is epistemically better than another. However, it has been suggested that Goldman's theory is not really an epistemic value theory at all because whether one outcome is epistemically better than another partly depends on our non-epistemic interests. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic value theory that serves the purposes of social epistemology must incorporate non-epistemic interests in much the way that Goldman's theory does. In fact, I argue that Goldman's theory does not go far enough in this direction. In particular, the epistemic value of having a particular true belief should actually be weighted by how interested we are in the topic.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)177-188
Number of pages12
JournalEpisteme
Volume2
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2006

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Epistemic Values
Value Theory
Social Epistemology
Social Worlds

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History and Philosophy of Science

Cite this

Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology. / Fallis, Don T.

In: Episteme, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2006, p. 177-188.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Fallis, Don T. / Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology. In: Episteme. 2006 ; Vol. 2, No. 3. pp. 177-188.
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