Evolution and persistence of obligate mutualists and exploiters: Competition for partners and evolutionary immunization

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

69 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Mutualisms are ubiquitous in nature, as is their exploitation by both conspecific and heterospecific cheaters. Yet, evolutionary theory predicts that cheating should be favoured by natural selection. Here, we show theoretically that asymmetrical competition for partners generally determines the evolutionary fate of obligate mutualisms facing exploitation by third-species invaders. When asymmetry in partner competition is relatively weak, mutualists may either exclude exploiters or coexist with them, in which case their co-evolutionary response to exploitation is usually benign. When asymmetry is strong, the mutualists evolve towards evolutionary attractors where they become extremely vulnerable to exploiter invasion. However, exploiter invasion at an early stage of the mutualism's history can deflect mutualists' co-evolutionary trajectories towards slightly different attractors that confer long-term stability against further exploitation. Thus, coexistence of mutualists and exploiters may often involve an historical effect whereby exploiters are co-opted early in mutualism history and provide lasting 'evolutionary immunization' against further invasion.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)115-126
Number of pages12
JournalEcology Letters
Volume10
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2007

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immunization
mutualism
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asymmetry
evolutionary theory
coexistence
trajectory

Keywords

  • Cheating
  • Coevolution
  • Coexistence
  • Competition for partners
  • Competitive asymmetry
  • Evolutionary immunization
  • Evolutionary suicide
  • Exploitation
  • Mutualism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Ecology

Cite this

Evolution and persistence of obligate mutualists and exploiters : Competition for partners and evolutionary immunization. / Ferriere, Regis H J; Gauduchon, Mathias; Bronstein, Judith L.

In: Ecology Letters, Vol. 10, No. 2, 02.2007, p. 115-126.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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