Evolution of communication with partial common interest

Andreas - Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Yong Gwan Kim, Geoffrey B. Sprinkle

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

60 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We experimentally investigate communication in sender-receiver games with imperfect incentive alignment. We consider both a priori meaningless messages and messages with pre-established meanings. Under four canonical incentive conditions, we get communication outcomes. However, it is by no means a fait accompli. We observe significant deterioration and recoding of a priori meanings, sucker behavior by receivers, and focal point and initial condition effects. A conservative partial common interest (PCI) condition generally is a reliable, albeit coarse predictor of the form of communication. Equilibrium selection criteria sometimes improve on the PCI prediction but neither influentiality, ex ante efficiency, nor Farrell's neologism-proofness refinement is reliable across all games, and equilibria are not always obtained. Considering comparative statics, equilibrium selection criteria are helpful but imperfect predictors of how equilibrium frequencies respond to incentives, whereas the less ambitious PCI prediction is never rejected by the data. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)79-120
Number of pages42
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume37
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2001
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Communication
Prediction
Equilibrium selection
Incentives
Selection criteria
Predictors
Economics
Comparative statics
Deterioration
Incentive alignment
Initial conditions

Keywords

  • Cheap talk
  • Communication
  • Evolution
  • Game theory
  • Incentive alignment
  • Information transmission
  • Learning
  • Meaning
  • Refinements

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Evolution of communication with partial common interest. / Blume, Andreas -; DeJong, Douglas V.; Kim, Yong Gwan; Sprinkle, Geoffrey B.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2001, p. 79-120.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Blume, Andreas - ; DeJong, Douglas V. ; Kim, Yong Gwan ; Sprinkle, Geoffrey B. / Evolution of communication with partial common interest. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2001 ; Vol. 37, No. 1. pp. 79-120.
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