Experimental comparisons of auctions under single- and multi-unit demand

Paul Alsemgeest, Charles Noussair, Mark Olson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

46 Scopus citations

Abstract

An English clock auction and a sealed-bid auction with lowest accepted-bid pricing are studied in a controlled laboratory setting. Buyers bid for either a single unit or two units of the good. The sealed-bid auction generates more revenue than the English clock auction in both cases. The revenue from the English clock auction is lower in the two-unit demand environment than in the single-unit demand environment, due to strategic demand reduction on the part of bidders. (JEL C92, D44).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)87-97
Number of pages11
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume36
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1998
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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