Further Reflections on The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert: A Reply to Nelkin and Pereboom

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In my “The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert,” I argued that against a familiar claim in the free will debate: that the freedom in dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists is limited to the type required for an agent to deserve blame for moral wrongdoing, and to deserve it in a sense that is basic. In that earlier paper, I sought a rationale for this claim, offered an explanation of basic desert, and then argued that the free will debate can persist even when divorced from basic desert. Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom then argued against my thesis. In this paper, I reply to their thoughtful criticisms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalJournal of Ethics
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

Fingerprint

Free Will
Compatibilist
Incompatibilist
Derk Pereboom
Criticism
Dispute
Wrongdoing

Keywords

  • Blame
  • Dana Nelkin
  • Derk Pereboom
  • Desert
  • Free will
  • Moral responsibility

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

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