Further results on inquiry and truth possession

Don Fallis, Gerrard Liddell

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Goldman and Shaked (Statist. Probab. Lett. 12 (1991) 415) show that, for all reciprocally convex measures of truth possession, experiments are always "objectively" expected to increase a scientist's degree of truth possession. We show that this result is optimal. Further, we argue that all scientifically acceptable measures of truth possession are proper scoring rules. However, no bounded proper scoring rules are reciprocally convex. Thus, we establish that, for many scientifically acceptable measures of truth possession, experiments are only "subjectively" expected to increase a scientist's degree of truth possession.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)169-182
Number of pages14
JournalStatistics and Probability Letters
Volume60
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 15 2002

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Keywords

  • Epistemic utility
  • Philosophy of science
  • Proper scoring rules
  • Scientific experiment
  • Truth acquisition
  • Truth possession

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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